Can Anyone Show Me One Or More Parts of The Ordinary Of The Novus Ordo Missal That Is Contrary To Catholicism ?

[Stubborn]

Looks like you just confirmed that the NO is in no way infallible.

Since the Church is endowed with infallible authority for the express purpose of preserving intact the deposit of revealed truth and for expounding it without error.................... this alone condemns the belief that the NO is free from error.

You're admitting the possibility of error and/or heresy in the non-solemnly defined teachings of the pope, Stubby?

Shame.   

You will always believe that the pope cannot err - so whats the point?

In order for him to not err, he has to teach something the Church has always taught.
 
The New Order being new is not something the Church has always taught because it is new and per St. Pius X, modernistic.

[Norbert]

Can I just say that people could stand to calm down and take a few deep breaths before posting on this thread?

SSPX defenders...is the only thing propping up Society marriages and confessions the assertion of the Society's priests claiming a state of necessity? 

That seems...problematic to me.

So be it, a lot of us think the acts of apostasy and heretical theology rife within Church hierarchy as being problematic, but hey, who's to say saving souls isn't evil too? (sarcasm)

Slow your roll there hoss.  I'm just pointing out that it's bothersome to me that really, there's no way of "knowing", e.g., outside of personal conviction that "well things are so bad that there HAS to be a state of necessity".  The Church has the power to bind and loose.  If it doesn't, e.g., if it cannot even promulgate a rite without that rite being "rife with heresy and apostasy", if SSPX sacraments are valid despite doubts expressed by hierarchs in the Church, than the Church is not the Church, the SSPX is.

But people like TrentCath keep attacking sedes/privationists like C_Philly for coming to that exact conclusion.

Seems to be a lot of "cognitive dissonance" THERE, if you ask me.

[Norbert]

And while I clearly haven't done as much research on "types of jurisdiction" as others here, I have to say it's kind of silly to argue that jurisdiction arises from the law, rather than the "lawgiver", e.g., a local priest or bishop, and yet not believe those lawgivers to be pretenders to their authority (e.g., be a sede). 

Walking the middle way leads to a simultaneous assertion that the pope is the pope, the bishops, bishops, yet we can ignore their authority and substitute our own.

[JayneK]

I just don't see that the prayer is heretical.  If the Jews "grow in faithfulness to his covenant", since there is only one covenant in effect, namely the new and eternal covenant poured out for you and for many, then they can only grow in faithfulness to this new covenant. I suppose you can interpret it as heresy, but I disagree with that interpretation.

 With all due respect, I think you choose to interpret it this way for your own convenience. The Jews can't grow in faithfulness because they don't worship the God of Abraham. Moreover to grow in faithfulness one first needs to have the Faith, and adherence to Talmudic theology is a clear rejection of the Faith.

It isn't just convenience.  He is using the interpretative principle that the pope says we are supposed to use - the "hermeneutic of continuity."  Statements should be understood in a way that does not contradict Tradition.  It is a horribly unclear prayer, very easily misunderstood in a heretical way, and the sooner it is gotten rid of the better.  But it is possible to understand it in an orthodox way, as a reference to the eschatological conversion of the Jews, that has always been believed by the Church. 

[TrentCath]

You have no idea what supplied jurisdiction is do you?  The whole basis for it is ordinary jurisdiction.  Deny the ordinary and you have no leg on which to stand.  You can't appeal to 'ex lege' when you deny the very lege. 

Likewise, you have no idea what common error is.  It is the belief of the people that a priest who, in fact, has no jurisdiction does have jurisdiction.  Which is why I say, it is extremely improbable that most SSPX faithful can claim ignorance on that score.  Necessity might reasonably be argued in the absence of the competent territorial authority which is not the case here.

You can believe what you want no matter how absurd, illogical and nonsensical, or contrary to divine law, common sense and rational discourse it is since God gave us free will.   

Its a pity that your view flatly contradicts canon law and commentaries on it.

As I said elsewhere

For example the 'Manual of Moral theology' by Thomas Slater, SJ (published in 1925) states '.......In danger of death, all priests, even though not approved for hearing confessions, may validly and lawfully absolve any penitents from any sins or censures, however reserved and notorious they may be, and even though an approved priest be present, but the special law about absolving an accomplice must be observed (Can. 882).... In case of common mistake when many of the faithful think that a priest has faculties when he has not, the Church supplies Jurisdiction, but if a priest knowingly exposes himself to hear confessions without faculties he sins grievously.
The Church supplies jurisdiction in case of a positive doubt and probability as to whether a priest has it (can. 209)' p152 (Jurisdiction of the minister of penance

'When Jurisdiction is supplied by the Church. In common error or in positive and probable doubt of law or fact, the Church supplies jurisdiction for both the external and internal forum....

Common error. Error is a false judgement of the mind; and the error with which we are here concerned is error regarding the existence of jurisdiction. The person is erroneously believe to have jurisdiction, whereas he has not. Common error is opposed to private error, and means in general an error which is in some sense common to the people of the place (diocese, parish, chapter, religious community) where the act is placed. The circumstances required to constitute common error are nearly all disputed by some one. We shall state those which, according to solid reason and authority, are certainly sufficient in practice...

In a certain sense, the error must be common; that is, must affect, not merely a private party, but the people of the locality as a class...It is not required that the majority of the persons of the place actually elicit a false judgment regarding the fact of the existence of jurisdiction. It is sufficient that they be in  a state of error; that is, such a state of mind, that, if asked, they would reply erroneously on that question.......

Must there be some probability of the existence of jurisdiction? Here we must distinguish; if the common error is purely an error of fact, it need not be probable; but if the mistaken conclusion on the fact results from an error of law, the error is not sufficient unless it has some probability. If it has probability, the title for the supplying of jurisdiction is not common error but 'positive and probable doubt of law'

The theory of interpretative common error may be outlined as follows. Interpretative, common error means common error whose existence is determined, not by strict proof, but by a sort of reasonable presumption. Instead of a plebiscite to learn whether the people as a class were actually in error regarding the existence of jurisdiction (this impossible course would seem to be the only means of strict proof if actual error were required), the common error is presumed to exist in all cases where there exists a public circumstance or set of circumstances (and these can be strictly proved), from which all reasonable persons, without any error of law, would naturally conclude that jurisdiction existed. This a priest sitting publicly in a confessional in a public parish may be presumed to have received general faculties for confessions. If the fact is that he has not, yet the public circumstance would be a sufficient reasonable foundation for interpretative common error; and the Church would supply the jurisdiction for each and every confession heard in these circumstances... It should be noted that common error in this case is entirely independent of any error of law. People will fall into the error even if they know the law, and precisely because they know it; for the law is that confessor usually receive general jurisdiction for confessions and do not need special delegation...Is the above theory of interpretative common error supported by sufficient reason and authority to make it practically safe? We answer unhesitatingly, yes.....

Positive and probable doubt.

Doubt means a state of mind in which the mind suspends assent or remains undecided between assent and denial.
Doubt is positive if there is a serious reason for assenting to a proposition, yet the prudent fear of error is not entirely excluded. A merely negative doubt exists if there is no reason, or at least no serious reason for assent.
A doubt is probable if there is a solid and probable reason in favour of the proposition, which, however is not certain.
A doubt of law means a doubt concerning the existence or meaning of the law; a doubt of fact is a doubt concerning the existence of any concrete fact other than the existence of the law

Principles summarised.

In common error, not of law but of fact, the Church supplies jurisdiction.Here, the want of jurisdiction, until the Church supplies it, is certain.

In positive and probable doubt, either of law or fact, the Church supplies jurisdiction. Here the existence of Jurisdiction, even before the Church supplies it, is probable, after the Church supplies it, it is certain.

As regards the licitness of the use of Jurisdiction which is merely supplied by the Church:

(a) in a positive and probable doubt of law, the use is simply licit
(b) in a positive and probable doubt of fact, at least no grave reason is required, and in practice the use is licit without inquiring for a reason
(c) in common error the use is illicit without a grave reason, which may often be prudently conjectured

Bouscaren and Ellis, Canon Law, a Text and Commentary 1955 p141-144


You are also wrong in saying or implying that the society does not recognise ordinary jurisdiction, the Society does but what it does not do is accept the commands that are dangerous to souls nor the theological errors, heresies and quasi heresies which effect those who have the ordinary power of jursidiction though from time to time I am assured they get jurisdiction in specific cases. As support for that position one can see Bl Cardinal Newmans letter to the duke of Norfolk

What is the use of forming impossible cases? One can find plenty of them in books of casuistry, with the answers attached in respect to them. In an actual case, a Catholic would, of course, not act simply on his own judgment; at the same time, there are supposable cases in which he would be obliged to go by it solely—viz., when his conscience could not be reconciled to any of the courses of action proposed to him by others.

In support of what I have been saying, I refer to one or two weighty authorities:—

Cardinal Turrecremata says, "Although it clearly follows from the circumstance that the Pope can err at times, and command things which must not be done, that we are not to be simply obedient to him in all things, that does not show that he must not be obeyed by all when his commands are good. To know in what cases he is to be obeyed and in what not ... it is said in the Acts of the Apostles, 'One ought to obey God rather than man:' therefore, were the Pope to command anything against Holy Scripture, or the articles of faith, or the truth of the Sacraments, or the commands of the natural or divine law, he ought not to be obeyed, but in such commands is to be passed over (despiciendus)."—Summ. de Eccl., pp. 47, 48.

Bellarmine, speaking of resisting the Pope, says, {243} "In order to resist and defend oneself no authority is required ... Therefore, as it is lawful to resist the Pope, if he assaulted a man's person, so it is lawful to resist him, if he assaulted souls, or troubled the state (turbanti rempublicam), and much more if he strove to destroy the Church. It is lawful, I say, to resist him, by not doing what he commands, and hindering the execution of his will."—De Rom. Pont., ii. 29.

Archbishop Kenrick says, "His power was given for edification, not for destruction. If he uses it from the love of domination (quod absit) scarcely will he meet with obedient populations."—Theolog. Moral., t. i. p. 158.

When, then, Mr. Gladstone asks Catholics how they can obey the Queen and yet obey the Pope, since it may happen that the commands of the two authorities may clash, I answer, that it is my rule, both to obey the one and to obey the other, but that there is no rule in this world without exceptions, and if either the Pope or the Queen demanded of me an "Absolute Obedience," he or she would be transgressing the laws of human society. I give an absolute obedience to neither. Further, if ever this double allegiance pulled me in contrary ways, which in this age of the world I think it never will, then I should decide according to the particular case, which is beyond all rule, and must be decided on its own merits. I should look to see what theologians could do for me, what the Bishops and clergy around me, what my confessor; what friends whom I revered: and if, after all, I could not take their view of {244} the matter, then I must rule myself by my own judgment and my own conscience. But all this is hypothetical and unreal.

Here, of course, it will be objected to me, that I am, after all, having recourse to the Protestant doctrine of Private Judgment; not so; it is the Protestant doctrine that Private Judgment is our ordinary guide in religious matters, but I use it, in the case in question, in very extraordinary and rare, nay, impossible emergencies. Do not the highest Tories thus defend the substitution of William for James II.? It is a great mistake to suppose our state in the Catholic Church is so entirely subjected to rule and system, that we are never thrown upon what is called by divines "the Providence of God." The teaching and assistance of the Church does not supply all conceivable needs, but those which are ordinary; thus, for instance, the sacraments are necessary for dying in the grace of God and hope of heaven, yet, when they cannot be got, acts of faith, hope, and contrition, with the desire for those aids which the dying man has not, will convey in substance what those aids ordinarily convey. And so a Catechumen, not yet baptized, may be saved by his purpose and preparation to receive the rite. And so, again, though "Out of the Church there is no salvation," this does not hold in the case of good men who are in invincible ignorance. And so it is also in the case of our ordinations; Chillingworth and Macau1ay say that it is morally impossible that we should have kept up for 1800 years an Apostolical succession of ministers without some breaks in the chain; and we in answer say that, however true this {245} may be humanly speaking, there has been a special Providence over the Church to secure it. Once more, how else could private Catholics save their souls when there was a Pope and Anti-popes, each severally claiming their allegiance?

Though I don't expect you'll even bother to read this, it is never the less clear you are quite simply wrong

[DrBombay]

Looks like you just confirmed that the NO is in no way infallible.

Since the Church is endowed with infallible authority for the express purpose of preserving intact the deposit of revealed truth and for expounding it without error.................... this alone condemns the belief that the NO is free from error.

You're admitting the possibility of error and/or heresy in the non-solemnly defined teachings of the pope, Stubby?

Shame.   

You will always believe that the pope cannot err - so whats the point?

In order for him to not err, he has to teach something the Church has always taught.
 
The New Order being new is not something the Church has always taught because it is new and per St. Pius X, modernistic.

I never said the pope cannot err.  That's a lie.  You're a liar. 

You go to hell for lying, you lying liar. 

[Stubborn]

I just don't see that the prayer is heretical.  If the Jews "grow in faithfulness to his covenant", since there is only one covenant in effect, namely the new and eternal covenant poured out for you and for many, then they can only grow in faithfulness to this new covenant. I suppose you can interpret it as heresy, but I disagree with that interpretation.

 With all due respect, I think you choose to interpret it this way for your own convenience. The Jews can't grow in faithfulness because they don't worship the God of Abraham. Moreover to grow in faithfulness one first needs to have the Faith, and adherence to Talmudic theology is a clear rejection of the Faith.

It isn't just convenience.  He is using the interpretative principle that the pope says we are supposed to use - the "hermeneutic of continuity."  Statements should be understood in a way that does not contradict Tradition.  It is a horribly unclear prayer, very easily misunderstood in a heretical way, and the sooner it is gotten rid of the better.  But it is possible to understand it in an orthodox way, as a reference to the eschatological conversion of the Jews, that has always been believed by the Church. 

The interpretative principle that the pope says we are supposed to use - the "hermeneutic (interpretative) of continuity" is not even a principle we ever had to be coached to use before. And btw,  does he even demand we interpret it like that about that prayer? Does he at least suggest it? Recommend it? I don't know but I do not believe he ever mentioned how that prayer was supposed to be interpreted.

It is wrong to make a prayer purposely ambiguous enough to have a double meaning like that, ambiguous enough to initially be heretical *unless* you are told to understand it using  the "hermeneutic of continuity". WTH is that? It is a flipping disaster, that's what it is.
 
.....I hate arrogance, and pride, and every wicked way, and a mouth with a double tongue. - Proverbs 8:13

Ambiguity's very purpose is to lend itself to the "double tongue", and is the mark of modernism, and while it can aid the faithful to spot the modernist,  it also fools the faithful into error - all the while satisfying those in error (the Jews) so that they have no need to even think of conversion, nor for Jews to think that the Catholics think they need to convert -  ambiguity also apes the first of the four marks of the Church - "One".  How wonderful is this NO and ambiguous term "hermeneutic of continuity" hey?

However one chooses to interpret that prayer, the one thing that can be said for certain is that it is not a prayer Catholics should pray.

[Dellery]

I just don't see that the prayer is heretical.  If the Jews "grow in faithfulness to his covenant", since there is only one covenant in effect, namely the new and eternal covenant poured out for you and for many, then they can only grow in faithfulness to this new covenant. I suppose you can interpret it as heresy, but I disagree with that interpretation.

 With all due respect, I think you choose to interpret it this way for your own convenience. The Jews can't grow in faithfulness because they don't worship the God of Abraham. Moreover to grow in faithfulness one first needs to have the Faith, and adherence to Talmudic theology is a clear rejection of the Faith.

It isn't just convenience.  He is using the interpretative principle that the pope says we are supposed to use - the "hermeneutic of continuity."  Statements should be understood in a way that does not contradict Tradition.  It is a horribly unclear prayer, very easily misunderstood in a heretical way, and the sooner it is gotten rid of the better.  But it is possible to understand it in an orthodox way, as a reference to the eschatological conversion of the Jews, that has always been believed by the Church. 

 This denies the reason inherent in God's religion. "Don't piss on my head and tell me it's raining", or in this case, tell me to believe it's rain. One can also believe a middle finger means that he is number 1, this doesn't change the fact that he would be wrong. Another turn around this road and we'll be told that Church law and believe is all relative. I follow the supposed "hermeneutic of continuity" approach out of obedience, as it is not heretical in of itself, but it is only applicable in instances where decrees ect. are ambiguous. The Good Friday prayer is not, as I explained in one of my previous posts.

[Stubborn]

I never said the pope cannot err.  That's a lie.  You're a liar. 

You go to hell for lying, you lying liar. 

.

[DrBombay]

You have no idea what supplied jurisdiction is do you?  The whole basis for it is ordinary jurisdiction.  Deny the ordinary and you have no leg on which to stand.  You can't appeal to 'ex lege' when you deny the very lege. 

Likewise, you have no idea what common error is.  It is the belief of the people that a priest who, in fact, has no jurisdiction does have jurisdiction.  Which is why I say, it is extremely improbable that most SSPX faithful can claim ignorance on that score.  Necessity might reasonably be argued in the absence of the competent territorial authority which is not the case here.

You can believe what you want no matter how absurd, illogical and nonsensical, or contrary to divine law, common sense and rational discourse it is since God gave us free will.   

Its a pity that your view flatly contradicts canon law and commentaries on it.

As I said elsewhere

For example the 'Manual of Moral theology' by Thomas Slater, SJ (published in 1925) states '.......In danger of death, all priests, even though not approved for hearing confessions, may validly and lawfully absolve any penitents from any sins or censures, however reserved and notorious they may be, and even though an approved priest be present, but the special law about absolving an accomplice must be observed (Can. 882).... In case of common mistake when many of the faithful think that a priest has faculties when he has not, the Church supplies Jurisdiction, but if a priest knowingly exposes himself to hear confessions without faculties he sins grievously.
The Church supplies jurisdiction in case of a positive doubt and probability as to whether a priest has it (can. 209)' p152 (Jurisdiction of the minister of penance

'When Jurisdiction is supplied by the Church. In common error or in positive and probable doubt of law or fact, the Church supplies jurisdiction for both the external and internal forum....

Common error. Error is a false judgement of the mind; and the error with which we are here concerned is error regarding the existence of jurisdiction. The person is erroneously believe to have jurisdiction, whereas he has not. Common error is opposed to private error, and means in general an error which is in some sense common to the people of the place (diocese, parish, chapter, religious community) where the act is placed. The circumstances required to constitute common error are nearly all disputed by some one. We shall state those which, according to solid reason and authority, are certainly sufficient in practice...

In a certain sense, the error must be common; that is, must affect, not merely a private party, but the people of the locality as a class...It is not required that the majority of the persons of the place actually elicit a false judgment regarding the fact of the existence of jurisdiction. It is sufficient that they be in  a state of error; that is, such a state of mind, that, if asked, they would reply erroneously on that question.......

Must there be some probability of the existence of jurisdiction? Here we must distinguish; if the common error is purely an error of fact, it need not be probable; but if the mistaken conclusion on the fact results from an error of law, the error is not sufficient unless it has some probability. If it has probability, the title for the supplying of jurisdiction is not common error but 'positive and probable doubt of law'

The theory of interpretative common error may be outlined as follows. Interpretative, common error means common error whose existence is determined, not by strict proof, but by a sort of reasonable presumption. Instead of a plebiscite to learn whether the people as a class were actually in error regarding the existence of jurisdiction (this impossible course would seem to be the only means of strict proof if actual error were required), the common error is presumed to exist in all cases where there exists a public circumstance or set of circumstances (and these can be strictly proved), from which all reasonable persons, without any error of law, would naturally conclude that jurisdiction existed. This a priest sitting publicly in a confessional in a public parish may be presumed to have received general faculties for confessions. If the fact is that he has not, yet the public circumstance would be a sufficient reasonable foundation for interpretative common error; and the Church would supply the jurisdiction for each and every confession heard in these circumstances... It should be noted that common error in this case is entirely independent of any error of law. People will fall into the error even if they know the law, and precisely because they know it; for the law is that confessor usually receive general jurisdiction for confessions and do not need special delegation...Is the above theory of interpretative common error supported by sufficient reason and authority to make it practically safe? We answer unhesitatingly, yes.....

Positive and probable doubt.

Doubt means a state of mind in which the mind suspends assent or remains undecided between assent and denial.
Doubt is positive if there is a serious reason for assenting to a proposition, yet the prudent fear of error is not entirely excluded. A merely negative doubt exists if there is no reason, or at least no serious reason for assent.
A doubt is probable if there is a solid and probable reason in favour of the proposition, which, however is not certain.
A doubt of law means a doubt concerning the existence or meaning of the law; a doubt of fact is a doubt concerning the existence of any concrete fact other than the existence of the law

Principles summarised.

In common error, not of law but of fact, the Church supplies jurisdiction.Here, the want of jurisdiction, until the Church supplies it, is certain.

In positive and probable doubt, either of law or fact, the Church supplies jurisdiction. Here the existence of Jurisdiction, even before the Church supplies it, is probable, after the Church supplies it, it is certain.

As regards the licitness of the use of Jurisdiction which is merely supplied by the Church:

(a) in a positive and probable doubt of law, the use is simply licit
(b) in a positive and probable doubt of fact, at least no grave reason is required, and in practice the use is licit without inquiring for a reason
(c) in common error the use is illicit without a grave reason, which may often be prudently conjectured

Bouscaren and Ellis, Canon Law, a Text and Commentary 1955 p141-144


You are also wrong in saying or implying that the society does not recognise ordinary jurisdiction, the Society does but what it does not do is accept the commands that are dangerous to souls nor the theological errors, heresies and quasi heresies which effect those who have the ordinary power of jursidiction though from time to time I am assured they get jurisdiction in specific cases. As support for that position one can see Bl Cardinal Newmans letter to the duke of Norfolk

What is the use of forming impossible cases? One can find plenty of them in books of casuistry, with the answers attached in respect to them. In an actual case, a Catholic would, of course, not act simply on his own judgment; at the same time, there are supposable cases in which he would be obliged to go by it solely—viz., when his conscience could not be reconciled to any of the courses of action proposed to him by others.

In support of what I have been saying, I refer to one or two weighty authorities:—

Cardinal Turrecremata says, "Although it clearly follows from the circumstance that the Pope can err at times, and command things which must not be done, that we are not to be simply obedient to him in all things, that does not show that he must not be obeyed by all when his commands are good. To know in what cases he is to be obeyed and in what not ... it is said in the Acts of the Apostles, 'One ought to obey God rather than man:' therefore, were the Pope to command anything against Holy Scripture, or the articles of faith, or the truth of the Sacraments, or the commands of the natural or divine law, he ought not to be obeyed, but in such commands is to be passed over (despiciendus)."—Summ. de Eccl., pp. 47, 48.

Bellarmine, speaking of resisting the Pope, says, {243} "In order to resist and defend oneself no authority is required ... Therefore, as it is lawful to resist the Pope, if he assaulted a man's person, so it is lawful to resist him, if he assaulted souls, or troubled the state (turbanti rempublicam), and much more if he strove to destroy the Church. It is lawful, I say, to resist him, by not doing what he commands, and hindering the execution of his will."—De Rom. Pont., ii. 29.

Archbishop Kenrick says, "His power was given for edification, not for destruction. If he uses it from the love of domination (quod absit) scarcely will he meet with obedient populations."—Theolog. Moral., t. i. p. 158.

When, then, Mr. Gladstone asks Catholics how they can obey the Queen and yet obey the Pope, since it may happen that the commands of the two authorities may clash, I answer, that it is my rule, both to obey the one and to obey the other, but that there is no rule in this world without exceptions, and if either the Pope or the Queen demanded of me an "Absolute Obedience," he or she would be transgressing the laws of human society. I give an absolute obedience to neither. Further, if ever this double allegiance pulled me in contrary ways, which in this age of the world I think it never will, then I should decide according to the particular case, which is beyond all rule, and must be decided on its own merits. I should look to see what theologians could do for me, what the Bishops and clergy around me, what my confessor; what friends whom I revered: and if, after all, I could not take their view of {244} the matter, then I must rule myself by my own judgment and my own conscience. But all this is hypothetical and unreal.

Here, of course, it will be objected to me, that I am, after all, having recourse to the Protestant doctrine of Private Judgment; not so; it is the Protestant doctrine that Private Judgment is our ordinary guide in religious matters, but I use it, in the case in question, in very extraordinary and rare, nay, impossible emergencies. Do not the highest Tories thus defend the substitution of William for James II.? It is a great mistake to suppose our state in the Catholic Church is so entirely subjected to rule and system, that we are never thrown upon what is called by divines "the Providence of God." The teaching and assistance of the Church does not supply all conceivable needs, but those which are ordinary; thus, for instance, the sacraments are necessary for dying in the grace of God and hope of heaven, yet, when they cannot be got, acts of faith, hope, and contrition, with the desire for those aids which the dying man has not, will convey in substance what those aids ordinarily convey. And so a Catechumen, not yet baptized, may be saved by his purpose and preparation to receive the rite. And so, again, though "Out of the Church there is no salvation," this does not hold in the case of good men who are in invincible ignorance. And so it is also in the case of our ordinations; Chillingworth and Macau1ay say that it is morally impossible that we should have kept up for 1800 years an Apostolical succession of ministers without some breaks in the chain; and we in answer say that, however true this {245} may be humanly speaking, there has been a special Providence over the Church to secure it. Once more, how else could private Catholics save their souls when there was a Pope and Anti-popes, each severally claiming their allegiance?

Though I don't expect you'll even bother to read this, it is never the less clear you are quite simply wrong

None of that applies to the SSPX.  You are quite simply wrong.  I can misuse bold font too.