Can Anyone Show Me One Or More Parts of The Ordinary Of The Novus Ordo Missal That Is Contrary To Catholicism ?

[Norbert]

You have no idea what supplied jurisdiction is do you?  The whole basis for it is ordinary jurisdiction.  Deny the ordinary and you have no leg on which to stand.  You can't appeal to 'ex lege' when you deny the very lege. 

Likewise, you have no idea what common error is.  It is the belief of the people that a priest who, in fact, has no jurisdiction does have jurisdiction.  Which is why I say, it is extremely improbable that most SSPX faithful can claim ignorance on that score.  Necessity might reasonably be argued in the absence of the competent territorial authority which is not the case here.

You can believe what you want no matter how absurd, illogical and nonsensical, or contrary to divine law, common sense and rational discourse it is since God gave us free will.   

Its a pity that your view flatly contradicts canon law and commentaries on it.

As I said elsewhere

For example the 'Manual of Moral theology' by Thomas Slater, SJ (published in 1925) states '.......In danger of death, all priests, even though not approved for hearing confessions, may validly and lawfully absolve any penitents from any sins or censures, however reserved and notorious they may be, and even though an approved priest be present, but the special law about absolving an accomplice must be observed (Can. 882).... In case of common mistake when many of the faithful think that a priest has faculties when he has not, the Church supplies Jurisdiction, but if a priest knowingly exposes himself to hear confessions without faculties he sins grievously.
The Church supplies jurisdiction in case of a positive doubt and probability as to whether a priest has it (can. 209)' p152 (Jurisdiction of the minister of penance

'When Jurisdiction is supplied by the Church. In common error or in positive and probable doubt of law or fact, the Church supplies jurisdiction for both the external and internal forum....

Common error. Error is a false judgement of the mind; and the error with which we are here concerned is error regarding the existence of jurisdiction. The person is erroneously believe to have jurisdiction, whereas he has not. Common error is opposed to private error, and means in general an error which is in some sense common to the people of the place (diocese, parish, chapter, religious community) where the act is placed. The circumstances required to constitute common error are nearly all disputed by some one. We shall state those which, according to solid reason and authority, are certainly sufficient in practice...

In a certain sense, the error must be common; that is, must affect, not merely a private party, but the people of the locality as a class...It is not required that the majority of the persons of the place actually elicit a false judgment regarding the fact of the existence of jurisdiction. It is sufficient that they be in  a state of error; that is, such a state of mind, that, if asked, they would reply erroneously on that question.......

Must there be some probability of the existence of jurisdiction? Here we must distinguish; if the common error is purely an error of fact, it need not be probable; but if the mistaken conclusion on the fact results from an error of law, the error is not sufficient unless it has some probability. If it has probability, the title for the supplying of jurisdiction is not common error but 'positive and probable doubt of law'

The theory of interpretative common error may be outlined as follows. Interpretative, common error means common error whose existence is determined, not by strict proof, but by a sort of reasonable presumption. Instead of a plebiscite to learn whether the people as a class were actually in error regarding the existence of jurisdiction (this impossible course would seem to be the only means of strict proof if actual error were required), the common error is presumed to exist in all cases where there exists a public circumstance or set of circumstances (and these can be strictly proved), from which all reasonable persons, without any error of law, would naturally conclude that jurisdiction existed. This a priest sitting publicly in a confessional in a public parish may be presumed to have received general faculties for confessions. If the fact is that he has not, yet the public circumstance would be a sufficient reasonable foundation for interpretative common error; and the Church would supply the jurisdiction for each and every confession heard in these circumstances... It should be noted that common error in this case is entirely independent of any error of law. People will fall into the error even if they know the law, and precisely because they know it; for the law is that confessor usually receive general jurisdiction for confessions and do not need special delegation...Is the above theory of interpretative common error supported by sufficient reason and authority to make it practically safe? We answer unhesitatingly, yes.....

Positive and probable doubt.

Doubt means a state of mind in which the mind suspends assent or remains undecided between assent and denial.
Doubt is positive if there is a serious reason for assenting to a proposition, yet the prudent fear of error is not entirely excluded. A merely negative doubt exists if there is no reason, or at least no serious reason for assent.
A doubt is probable if there is a solid and probable reason in favour of the proposition, which, however is not certain.
A doubt of law means a doubt concerning the existence or meaning of the law; a doubt of fact is a doubt concerning the existence of any concrete fact other than the existence of the law

Principles summarised.

In common error, not of law but of fact, the Church supplies jurisdiction.Here, the want of jurisdiction, until the Church supplies it, is certain.

In positive and probable doubt, either of law or fact, the Church supplies jurisdiction. Here the existence of Jurisdiction, even before the Church supplies it, is probable, after the Church supplies it, it is certain.

As regards the licitness of the use of Jurisdiction which is merely supplied by the Church:

(a) in a positive and probable doubt of law, the use is simply licit
(b) in a positive and probable doubt of fact, at least no grave reason is required, and in practice the use is licit without inquiring for a reason
(c) in common error the use is illicit without a grave reason, which may often be prudently conjectured

Bouscaren and Ellis, Canon Law, a Text and Commentary 1955 p141-144


You are also wrong in saying or implying that the society does not recognise ordinary jurisdiction, the Society does but what it does not do is accept the commands that are dangerous to souls nor the theological errors, heresies and quasi heresies which effect those who have the ordinary power of jursidiction though from time to time I am assured they get jurisdiction in specific cases. As support for that position one can see Bl Cardinal Newmans letter to the duke of Norfolk

What is the use of forming impossible cases? One can find plenty of them in books of casuistry, with the answers attached in respect to them. In an actual case, a Catholic would, of course, not act simply on his own judgment; at the same time, there are supposable cases in which he would be obliged to go by it solely—viz., when his conscience could not be reconciled to any of the courses of action proposed to him by others.

In support of what I have been saying, I refer to one or two weighty authorities:—

Cardinal Turrecremata says, "Although it clearly follows from the circumstance that the Pope can err at times, and command things which must not be done, that we are not to be simply obedient to him in all things, that does not show that he must not be obeyed by all when his commands are good. To know in what cases he is to be obeyed and in what not ... it is said in the Acts of the Apostles, 'One ought to obey God rather than man:' therefore, were the Pope to command anything against Holy Scripture, or the articles of faith, or the truth of the Sacraments, or the commands of the natural or divine law, he ought not to be obeyed, but in such commands is to be passed over (despiciendus)."—Summ. de Eccl., pp. 47, 48.

Bellarmine, speaking of resisting the Pope, says, {243} "In order to resist and defend oneself no authority is required ... Therefore, as it is lawful to resist the Pope, if he assaulted a man's person, so it is lawful to resist him, if he assaulted souls, or troubled the state (turbanti rempublicam), and much more if he strove to destroy the Church. It is lawful, I say, to resist him, by not doing what he commands, and hindering the execution of his will."—De Rom. Pont., ii. 29.

Archbishop Kenrick says, "His power was given for edification, not for destruction. If he uses it from the love of domination (quod absit) scarcely will he meet with obedient populations."—Theolog. Moral., t. i. p. 158.

When, then, Mr. Gladstone asks Catholics how they can obey the Queen and yet obey the Pope, since it may happen that the commands of the two authorities may clash, I answer, that it is my rule, both to obey the one and to obey the other, but that there is no rule in this world without exceptions, and if either the Pope or the Queen demanded of me an "Absolute Obedience," he or she would be transgressing the laws of human society. I give an absolute obedience to neither. Further, if ever this double allegiance pulled me in contrary ways, which in this age of the world I think it never will, then I should decide according to the particular case, which is beyond all rule, and must be decided on its own merits. I should look to see what theologians could do for me, what the Bishops and clergy around me, what my confessor; what friends whom I revered: and if, after all, I could not take their view of {244} the matter, then I must rule myself by my own judgment and my own conscience. But all this is hypothetical and unreal.

Here, of course, it will be objected to me, that I am, after all, having recourse to the Protestant doctrine of Private Judgment; not so; it is the Protestant doctrine that Private Judgment is our ordinary guide in religious matters, but I use it, in the case in question, in very extraordinary and rare, nay, impossible emergencies. Do not the highest Tories thus defend the substitution of William for James II.? It is a great mistake to suppose our state in the Catholic Church is so entirely subjected to rule and system, that we are never thrown upon what is called by divines "the Providence of God." The teaching and assistance of the Church does not supply all conceivable needs, but those which are ordinary; thus, for instance, the sacraments are necessary for dying in the grace of God and hope of heaven, yet, when they cannot be got, acts of faith, hope, and contrition, with the desire for those aids which the dying man has not, will convey in substance what those aids ordinarily convey. And so a Catechumen, not yet baptized, may be saved by his purpose and preparation to receive the rite. And so, again, though "Out of the Church there is no salvation," this does not hold in the case of good men who are in invincible ignorance. And so it is also in the case of our ordinations; Chillingworth and Macau1ay say that it is morally impossible that we should have kept up for 1800 years an Apostolical succession of ministers without some breaks in the chain; and we in answer say that, however true this {245} may be humanly speaking, there has been a special Providence over the Church to secure it. Once more, how else could private Catholics save their souls when there was a Pope and Anti-popes, each severally claiming their allegiance?

Though I don't expect you'll even bother to read this, it is never the less clear you are quite simply wrong

None of that applies to the SSPX.  You are quite simply wrong.  I can misuse bold font too.     

Pity you can't read, then.

So you are telling me that no one who goes to the sspx has a doubt of fact or a doubt of law? 

The very fact we are having this argument is prima facie evidence theres a doubt of law, so you may want to re think your position.

As for the quotes from Bl Cardinal Newman....  if you think that we have to obey all the nonsense thats come from Rome over the last 50 years

So now you change your argument to probable doubt?  I thought it was common error?  Very serpentine.  Which petard of supplied jurisdiction are you going to hoist yourself upon I wonder?

And I realize that the SSPX has a plethora of canon lawyers providing these informed, concise and well supported interpretations of the Church's law to their leadership and faithful.  It's a pity they keep them so well hidden, however.   

Actually I'm arguing them all

And as for denying the ordinary  Not what they do, they deny the ordinarys orders against the faith and maintain their 'operation survival' for the good of souls.

There's nothing against the faith in prohibiting the hearing of confessions or marriages when there are more than adequate diocesan priests to perform those functions.  You act like the SSPX priests are the only validly ordained priests in the world. 

Most people I know who attend SSPX parishes think they are.  That's kind of old news.

[TrentCath]

Oh, and by the way.  Doubt has to do with the doubt of the priest as to whether or not he has jurisdiction.  It has nothing to do with the faithful.  In the case of the SSPX there is absolutely no doubt, because the priests KNOW they don't have jurisdiction.  Without a doubt. 

Are you Blind or something? The quotes clearly state it has to do with the lay people and not the priest

Listen, buster.  Argue with the SSPX, not me.

http://www.sspx.org/miscellaneous/supplied_jurisdiction/validity_of_confessions_2.htm

3.5. Application to Our Case

It cannot be more clear: when the minister has an objective doubt, founded on the law itself or on the authoritative interpretation of the law, concerning the existence of his jurisdiction, the Church supplies the jurisdiction, even though the minister may have no jurisdiction at all.

Let us see some of the many practical applications which illustrate this doctrine:
A priest of the Society of Saint Pius X doubts about the existence of common error for confessions or for marriages in his chapel. He realizes that there are many canonical reasons and arguments for it, but he still doubts because the Bishop or the chancellor of the diocese say that such absolutions and marriages are invalid. The Church supplies jurisdiction because his doubt of law is positive and probable.

The same priest is taking care of a sick person and, even though there are many indications that the patient is getting worse, he doubts whether there is or is not a danger of death. Can he administer the Sacrament of Confirmation validly using the faculties of New Code Canon 883, 3? Yes, he can, because in a positive and probable doubt of fact the Church will certainly supply the jurisdiction which he may not have if the patient is actually not in danger of death.

The same scrupulous priest wonders if the extraordinary form of marriage contemplated in Canon 1098, New Code Canon 1116, is to be applied to the case of a couple who considers that they have no moral access to the Modernist parish priest. After hearing their reasons, he realizes that they have serious motives in arguing a grave spiritual danger and therefore impossibility of moral access to a Modernist parish priest. He can be at peace because, in the worst case, his doubt of fact and of law puts him in a state in which the Church will supply for the jurisdiction required to validly assist to such marriage.

Our Hamletic priest is now trying to justify this particular absolution on the grounds of Canon 2261, New Code Canon 1135, which recognizes to any faithful the right to ask a Sacrament or Sacramental from an excommunicated priest, a fortiori from a priest of our Society. Did he really ASK? I think he DID. Does the interpretation of this Canon apply to our case? It should, it seems it does, but maybe someone else will not agree... He agonizes! Well, since his doubt is an objective one, founded upon the law and upon the commentators, on facts and not on mere conjectures, he can be sure at least that the Church supplies in virtue of Canon 209.

 

The very same article deals with lay people doubting...

[DrBombay]

You have no idea what supplied jurisdiction is do you?  The whole basis for it is ordinary jurisdiction.  Deny the ordinary and you have no leg on which to stand.  You can't appeal to 'ex lege' when you deny the very lege. 

Likewise, you have no idea what common error is.  It is the belief of the people that a priest who, in fact, has no jurisdiction does have jurisdiction.  Which is why I say, it is extremely improbable that most SSPX faithful can claim ignorance on that score.  Necessity might reasonably be argued in the absence of the competent territorial authority which is not the case here.

You can believe what you want no matter how absurd, illogical and nonsensical, or contrary to divine law, common sense and rational discourse it is since God gave us free will.   

Its a pity that your view flatly contradicts canon law and commentaries on it.

As I said elsewhere

For example the 'Manual of Moral theology' by Thomas Slater, SJ (published in 1925) states '.......In danger of death, all priests, even though not approved for hearing confessions, may validly and lawfully absolve any penitents from any sins or censures, however reserved and notorious they may be, and even though an approved priest be present, but the special law about absolving an accomplice must be observed (Can. 882).... In case of common mistake when many of the faithful think that a priest has faculties when he has not, the Church supplies Jurisdiction, but if a priest knowingly exposes himself to hear confessions without faculties he sins grievously.
The Church supplies jurisdiction in case of a positive doubt and probability as to whether a priest has it (can. 209)' p152 (Jurisdiction of the minister of penance

'When Jurisdiction is supplied by the Church. In common error or in positive and probable doubt of law or fact, the Church supplies jurisdiction for both the external and internal forum....

Common error. Error is a false judgement of the mind; and the error with which we are here concerned is error regarding the existence of jurisdiction. The person is erroneously believe to have jurisdiction, whereas he has not. Common error is opposed to private error, and means in general an error which is in some sense common to the people of the place (diocese, parish, chapter, religious community) where the act is placed. The circumstances required to constitute common error are nearly all disputed by some one. We shall state those which, according to solid reason and authority, are certainly sufficient in practice...

In a certain sense, the error must be common; that is, must affect, not merely a private party, but the people of the locality as a class...It is not required that the majority of the persons of the place actually elicit a false judgment regarding the fact of the existence of jurisdiction. It is sufficient that they be in  a state of error; that is, such a state of mind, that, if asked, they would reply erroneously on that question.......

Must there be some probability of the existence of jurisdiction? Here we must distinguish; if the common error is purely an error of fact, it need not be probable; but if the mistaken conclusion on the fact results from an error of law, the error is not sufficient unless it has some probability. If it has probability, the title for the supplying of jurisdiction is not common error but 'positive and probable doubt of law'

The theory of interpretative common error may be outlined as follows. Interpretative, common error means common error whose existence is determined, not by strict proof, but by a sort of reasonable presumption. Instead of a plebiscite to learn whether the people as a class were actually in error regarding the existence of jurisdiction (this impossible course would seem to be the only means of strict proof if actual error were required), the common error is presumed to exist in all cases where there exists a public circumstance or set of circumstances (and these can be strictly proved), from which all reasonable persons, without any error of law, would naturally conclude that jurisdiction existed. This a priest sitting publicly in a confessional in a public parish may be presumed to have received general faculties for confessions. If the fact is that he has not, yet the public circumstance would be a sufficient reasonable foundation for interpretative common error; and the Church would supply the jurisdiction for each and every confession heard in these circumstances... It should be noted that common error in this case is entirely independent of any error of law. People will fall into the error even if they know the law, and precisely because they know it; for the law is that confessor usually receive general jurisdiction for confessions and do not need special delegation...Is the above theory of interpretative common error supported by sufficient reason and authority to make it practically safe? We answer unhesitatingly, yes.....

Positive and probable doubt.

Doubt means a state of mind in which the mind suspends assent or remains undecided between assent and denial.
Doubt is positive if there is a serious reason for assenting to a proposition, yet the prudent fear of error is not entirely excluded. A merely negative doubt exists if there is no reason, or at least no serious reason for assent.
A doubt is probable if there is a solid and probable reason in favour of the proposition, which, however is not certain.
A doubt of law means a doubt concerning the existence or meaning of the law; a doubt of fact is a doubt concerning the existence of any concrete fact other than the existence of the law

Principles summarised.

In common error, not of law but of fact, the Church supplies jurisdiction.Here, the want of jurisdiction, until the Church supplies it, is certain.

In positive and probable doubt, either of law or fact, the Church supplies jurisdiction. Here the existence of Jurisdiction, even before the Church supplies it, is probable, after the Church supplies it, it is certain.

As regards the licitness of the use of Jurisdiction which is merely supplied by the Church:

(a) in a positive and probable doubt of law, the use is simply licit
(b) in a positive and probable doubt of fact, at least no grave reason is required, and in practice the use is licit without inquiring for a reason
(c) in common error the use is illicit without a grave reason, which may often be prudently conjectured

Bouscaren and Ellis, Canon Law, a Text and Commentary 1955 p141-144


You are also wrong in saying or implying that the society does not recognise ordinary jurisdiction, the Society does but what it does not do is accept the commands that are dangerous to souls nor the theological errors, heresies and quasi heresies which effect those who have the ordinary power of jursidiction though from time to time I am assured they get jurisdiction in specific cases. As support for that position one can see Bl Cardinal Newmans letter to the duke of Norfolk

What is the use of forming impossible cases? One can find plenty of them in books of casuistry, with the answers attached in respect to them. In an actual case, a Catholic would, of course, not act simply on his own judgment; at the same time, there are supposable cases in which he would be obliged to go by it solely—viz., when his conscience could not be reconciled to any of the courses of action proposed to him by others.

In support of what I have been saying, I refer to one or two weighty authorities:—

Cardinal Turrecremata says, "Although it clearly follows from the circumstance that the Pope can err at times, and command things which must not be done, that we are not to be simply obedient to him in all things, that does not show that he must not be obeyed by all when his commands are good. To know in what cases he is to be obeyed and in what not ... it is said in the Acts of the Apostles, 'One ought to obey God rather than man:' therefore, were the Pope to command anything against Holy Scripture, or the articles of faith, or the truth of the Sacraments, or the commands of the natural or divine law, he ought not to be obeyed, but in such commands is to be passed over (despiciendus)."—Summ. de Eccl., pp. 47, 48.

Bellarmine, speaking of resisting the Pope, says, {243} "In order to resist and defend oneself no authority is required ... Therefore, as it is lawful to resist the Pope, if he assaulted a man's person, so it is lawful to resist him, if he assaulted souls, or troubled the state (turbanti rempublicam), and much more if he strove to destroy the Church. It is lawful, I say, to resist him, by not doing what he commands, and hindering the execution of his will."—De Rom. Pont., ii. 29.

Archbishop Kenrick says, "His power was given for edification, not for destruction. If he uses it from the love of domination (quod absit) scarcely will he meet with obedient populations."—Theolog. Moral., t. i. p. 158.

When, then, Mr. Gladstone asks Catholics how they can obey the Queen and yet obey the Pope, since it may happen that the commands of the two authorities may clash, I answer, that it is my rule, both to obey the one and to obey the other, but that there is no rule in this world without exceptions, and if either the Pope or the Queen demanded of me an "Absolute Obedience," he or she would be transgressing the laws of human society. I give an absolute obedience to neither. Further, if ever this double allegiance pulled me in contrary ways, which in this age of the world I think it never will, then I should decide according to the particular case, which is beyond all rule, and must be decided on its own merits. I should look to see what theologians could do for me, what the Bishops and clergy around me, what my confessor; what friends whom I revered: and if, after all, I could not take their view of {244} the matter, then I must rule myself by my own judgment and my own conscience. But all this is hypothetical and unreal.

Here, of course, it will be objected to me, that I am, after all, having recourse to the Protestant doctrine of Private Judgment; not so; it is the Protestant doctrine that Private Judgment is our ordinary guide in religious matters, but I use it, in the case in question, in very extraordinary and rare, nay, impossible emergencies. Do not the highest Tories thus defend the substitution of William for James II.? It is a great mistake to suppose our state in the Catholic Church is so entirely subjected to rule and system, that we are never thrown upon what is called by divines "the Providence of God." The teaching and assistance of the Church does not supply all conceivable needs, but those which are ordinary; thus, for instance, the sacraments are necessary for dying in the grace of God and hope of heaven, yet, when they cannot be got, acts of faith, hope, and contrition, with the desire for those aids which the dying man has not, will convey in substance what those aids ordinarily convey. And so a Catechumen, not yet baptized, may be saved by his purpose and preparation to receive the rite. And so, again, though "Out of the Church there is no salvation," this does not hold in the case of good men who are in invincible ignorance. And so it is also in the case of our ordinations; Chillingworth and Macau1ay say that it is morally impossible that we should have kept up for 1800 years an Apostolical succession of ministers without some breaks in the chain; and we in answer say that, however true this {245} may be humanly speaking, there has been a special Providence over the Church to secure it. Once more, how else could private Catholics save their souls when there was a Pope and Anti-popes, each severally claiming their allegiance?

Though I don't expect you'll even bother to read this, it is never the less clear you are quite simply wrong

None of that applies to the SSPX.  You are quite simply wrong.  I can misuse bold font too.     

Pity you can't read, then.

So you are telling me that no one who goes to the sspx has a doubt of fact or a doubt of law? 

The very fact we are having this argument is prima facie evidence theres a doubt of law, so you may want to re think your position.

As for the quotes from Bl Cardinal Newman....  if you think that we have to obey all the nonsense thats come from Rome over the last 50 years

So now you change your argument to probable doubt?  I thought it was common error?  Very serpentine.  Which petard of supplied jurisdiction are you going to hoist yourself upon I wonder?

And I realize that the SSPX has a plethora of canon lawyers providing these informed, concise and well supported interpretations of the Church's law to their leadership and faithful.  It's a pity they keep them so well hidden, however.   

Actually I'm arguing them all

And as for denying the ordinary  Not what they do, they deny the ordinarys orders against the faith and maintain their 'operation survival' for the good of souls.

There's nothing against the faith in prohibiting the hearing of confessions or marriages when there are more than adequate diocesan priests to perform those functions.  You act like the SSPX priests are the only validly ordained priests in the world. 

Most people I know who attend SSPX parishes think they are.  That's kind of old news.

Yes, I know.  But sometimes you can actually smoke them out and get them to admit it, though not often.

Anyhoo, I just wanted to add another quote to this already obscenely long quoted and re-quoted, etc. post.   

[Stubborn]

lol

So that's why the new mass is without error. The pope is infallible dagnabit!

<a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mS8zqQREg88" target="_blank">http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mS8zqQREg88</a>

This is worth a thread of it's own

[Phillipus Iacobus]

This all comes down to the ordinary & universal magisterium. Pius IX, Pius XI, Pius XII, and Vatican I all taught that the Ordinary & Universal Magisterium, is infallible and must be assented to with divine and Catholic Faith. We cannot dissent.

Now, liturgy is a part of the ordinary magisterium. Thus, a liturgy of the Catholic Church cannot give error, nor can it dissuade people from piety.

Here comes the Novus Ordo Missae. There are really only two options:
1. It is free from error, being a part of the O.U.M.
2. It contains error.

If it contains error, that means those who promulgate/created it were not the magisterium of the Church.

[Stubborn]

This all comes down to the ordinary & universal magisterium. Pius IX, Pius XI, Pius XII, and Vatican I all taught that the Ordinary & Universal Magisterium, is infallible and must be assented to with divine and Catholic Faith. We cannot dissent.

This is not true. Actually, it is only half true - which is worse than an outright lie.

Vatican 1 teaches: For the holy Spirit was promised to the successors of Peter not so that they might, by his revelation, make known some new doctrine, The New Order is a New Doctrine so per V1, the entire NO is not protected from error.

V1 continues:  but that, by his [The Holy Ghost's] assistance, they might religiously guard and faithfully expound the revelation or deposit of faith transmitted by the apostles.

This confirms the entire New Rite does not enjoy divine protection from error.

Now, liturgy is a part of the ordinary magisterium. Thus, a liturgy of the Catholic Church cannot give error, nor can it dissuade people from piety.

Says who? Where? Pope Paul VI himself declared it would disturb piety - the more pious the person, the greater the disturbance: We must prepare for this many-sided inconvenience. It is the kind of upset caused by every novelty that breaks in on our habits. We shall notice that pious persons are disturbed most Pope Paul VI

Here comes the Novus Ordo Missae. There are really only two options:
1. It is free from error, being a part of the O.U.M.
2. It contains error.

If it contains error, that means those who promulgate/created it were not the magisterium of the Church.

Well, we know #2 is true so #1 is false.

[Joseph11]

4. We must prepare for this many-sided inconvenience. It is the kind of upset caused by every novelty that breaks in on our habits. We shall notice that pious persons are disturbed most, because they have their own respectable way of hearing Mass, and they will feel shaken out of their usual thoughts and obliged to follow those of others. Even priests may feel some annoyance in this respect.

The attitude of this statement is outlandish for a pope.  Can you imagine any pope before him ever speaking in such a belittling way about the common faithful?!

What manner of man was this!

Whose are these thoughts "of others" to which he refers?

Calvinists!?

[INPEFESS]

4. We must prepare for this many-sided inconvenience. It is the kind of upset caused by every novelty that breaks in on our habits. We shall notice that pious persons are disturbed most, because they have their own respectable way of hearing Mass, and they will feel shaken out of their usual thoughts and obliged to follow those of others. Even priests may feel some annoyance in this respect.

The attitude of this statement is outlandish for a pope.  Can you imagine any pope before him ever speaking in such a belittling way about the common faithful?!

What manner of man was this!

Perhaps Fr. Luigi Villa's book about him can help!

[TrentCath]

This all comes down to the ordinary & universal magisterium. Pius IX, Pius XI, Pius XII, and Vatican I all taught that the Ordinary & Universal Magisterium, is infallible and must be assented to with divine and Catholic Faith. We cannot dissent.

Now, liturgy is a part of the ordinary magisterium. Thus, a liturgy of the Catholic Church cannot give error, nor can it dissuade people from piety.

Here comes the Novus Ordo Missae. There are really only two options:
1. It is free from error, being a part of the O.U.M.
2. It contains error.

If it contains error, that means those who promulgate/created it were not the magisterium of the Church.

Or option 3 your understanding of the magisterium is wrong.

[James02]

What "error" are we talking about?  How can a liturgy be "infallible"?  Seems like non-sequiturs.