Taking Divine Simplicity Seriously

[Su]

This is probably why the General Judgement is necessary.

It is clear from scripture and the teachings handed to us that we cannot properly understand God at all. That is why we have Faith and Hope given to us by God.

[Mithrandylan]

Well, I think that's an interesting point you've got there but as I see it, it probably only really counts if you're a Calvinist and believe in positive re probation, because while it might be said that those in Hell are witness to God's Justice, God doesn't send them to Hell for the exclusive purpose of exhibiting His justice.  That's more accidental, so to speak.  They are in Hell because they've hated God and it is what they deserve.  God didn't make them thinking "Now, these ones, I'm gonna put in Hell so everyone can see my justice, and the other one's will go to Heaven so they can see my Mercy." 

Maybe, but I  have seen the argument made that God does not provide efficacious grace to all because He wants to show His justice by condemning some to perdition. On the other hand, He is also supposed to be merciful, which is why He elects some to predestination. This was the sort of argument I was thinking of when I said that some attempts to explain predestination set up a false distinction between God's attributes.

Well, yes, a Thomist would probably say that because aside from that, the only reason one can give for God refusing efficacious grace to others is that "He has His reasons."  And that is the real answer, and the one we cannot understand, so an answer like "God refuses grace to some so that all will see His Justice as well as mercy" might be purported, however, I've never seen that argument presented as the reason that the damned are so.  Just the only reason that can be given that isn't "because God said so."  Perhaps you've heard it argued that the reprobate are reprobate in order for God to show His justice?

To be honest, I don't think that it's something even worth arguing as a reason because it isn't the primary reason, it's only accidental.  So if anyone is arguing that the reprobate are refused grace so that we can see God's justice and mercy, then I'd definitely take exception. 

[INPEFESS]

In many discussions here, especially those relating to predestination and hell, I often see some form of the claim that God elects some souls to salvation while damning others in order to show both us his mercy and justice respectively. But if we accept the notion that God is simple, that He is His attributes and these cannot really be divided up, does it really makes sense to say that God needs two different scenarios if He is to show us both His justice and His mercy? Now, you might say that God does this for our understanding since we cannot really tell how every single act of God manifests all of his attributes equally, but in that case wouldn't God be giving us a false impression of Himself? I'm not rejecting the idea of predestination, but this argument in support of the doctrine always seemed a little strange to me.

It's a good point of discussion you bring up. The source of this idea found in Augustian and Thomistic predestination is from the 9th chapter of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans:

[13] As it is written: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated. [14] What shall we say then? Is there injustice with God? God forbid. [15] For he saith to Moses: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I will shew mercy to whom I will shew mercy.

[16] So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy. [17] For the scripture saith to Pharao: To this purpose have I raised thee, that I may shew my power in thee, and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth. [18] Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will; and whom he will, he hardeneth. [19] Thou wilt say therefore to me: Why doth he then find fault? for who resisteth his will? [20] O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it: Why hast thou made me thus? 

[17] To this purpose: Not that God made him on purpose that he should sin, and so be damned; but foreseeing his obstinacy in sin, and the abuse of his own free will, he raised him up to be a mighty king, to make a more remarkable example of him: and that his power might be better known, and his justice in punishing him, published throughout the earth.

[21] Or hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? [22] What if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, [23] That he might shew the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he hath prepared unto glory? [24] Even us, whom also he hath called, nor only of the Jews, but also of the Gentiles. [25] As in Osee he saith: I will call that which was not my people, my people; and her that was not beloved, beloved; and her that had not obtained mercy, one that hath obtained mercy.

Here we see that it is from the execution of justice that mercy derives its merit. In the same manner in which we learn to appreciate the beauty of the sun relative to the dreariness of the rain, we appreciate the beauty of God's mercy relative to the terror of His justice. Both are good, but we, as created beings, wouldn't appeciate the beauty of mercy if there were no standard of justice by which it could be seen.

Both doctors the Church refer to this text in considering the question of predestination.

EDITED: clarity

[Gregory I]

I will go even Further INP. I will even dare to contend that the church has not condemned Double predestination, per se. What the Church has condemned in Calvin is the UNCONDITIONAL election of some to torment on God's part.

But, what if his Predestination of the damned were CONDITIONAL? Based on the foreseen sinfulness of individuals, God positively predestines some to damnation. BUT not unconditionally, only in view of their foreseen sinfulness and lack of repentance. Conversely, Before any consideration of merits, God has elected whom he will save from all eternity.

I just Found this by Ludwig Ott:

GOD, BY AN ETERNAL RESOLVE OF HIS WILL, PREDESTINES CERTAIN MEN, ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR FORESEEN SINS, TO ETERNAL REJECTION (De fide)
 
The reality of Reprobation is not formally defined, but it is the general teaching of the Church.
 
5) POSITIVE REPROBATION
 
Heretical Predestinationism in its various forms (the Southern Gallic priest Lucidus in the 5th century; the monk Gottschalk in the 9th century, according to reports of his opponents, which, however, find no confirmation in his recently re-discovered writings; Wycliffe, Hus, and esp. Calvin), teaches a positive predetermination to sin, and an unconditional Predestination to the eternal punishment of hell, that is, without consideration of future demerits. This was rejected as false doctrine by the Particular Synods of Orange, Quiercy & Valence and by the Council of Trent. Unconditioned positive Reprobation leads to a denial of the universality of the Divine Desire for salvation, and of the Redemption, and contradicts the Justice and Holiness of God as well as the freedom of man.

I trust the man who wrote Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma.


This naturally leads to the question:

What does it mean for God to will the salvation of all men, when he CLEARLY does NOT will to save all men, for he does not accomplish it? There is no such thing as longing or desire in God, for God is free from passion and change. Therefore, he can only will what he DOES. But he DOES NOT save all, therefore, in what sense does he will all to be saved?

St. Augustine understands ALL to mean all of the elect, or all KINDS of men, i.e. there is no category of men from which god will not draw his elect; slaves, black, white, yellow, brown, jews, Arabs, they can ALL be saved, if he wills it.

Does this interpretation run counter to the teaching of the church? I do not know. I know it is present in several of the Fathers, five right off the bat.

[INPEFESS]

This naturally leads to the question:

What does it mean for God to will the salvation of all men, when he CLEARLY does NOT will to save all men, for he does not accomplish it? There is no such thing as longing or desire in God, for God is free from passion and change. Therefore, he can only will what he DOES. But he DOES NOT save all, therefore, in what sense does he will all to be saved?

St. Augustine understands ALL to mean all of the elect, or all KINDS of men, i.e. there is no category of men from which god will not draw his elect; slaves, black, white, yellow, brown, jews, Arabs, they can ALL be saved, if he wills it.

Does this interpretation run counter to the teaching of the church? I do not know. I know it is present in several of the Fathers, five right off the bat.

According to St. Thomas, God's antecent will wills all men to be saved; God's consequent will does not.

I offer Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange's explanation:

Now we understand that God's efficacious will is always infallibly fulfilled. [389] Nothing that is in any way real and good can reach existence except in dependence on God's universal causality, because no second cause can act unless actuated by the first cause, and evil can never come to be without divine permission. [390].

So much on the efficacious will of God. In what sense, then, do we speak of God's inefficacious will? This will, says St. Thomas, [391] is a conditioned will, an antecedent will, which wills all that is good in itself, independently of circumstances. Now this conditional, antecedent will remain inefficacious because, in view of a higher good of which He alone is judge, God permits that this or that good thing does not come to pass, that defectible creatures sometimes fail, that this or that evil comes to pass. Thus, in view of that higher good, God permits, to illustrate, that harvests do not reach maturity, that the gazelle becomes the prey of the lion, that the just suffer persecution, that this or that sinner dies in final impenitence. Sometimes we see the higher good in question, sometimes we cannot. In permitting final impenitence, for example, God may be manifesting infinite justice against obstinacy in evil.

1. The Nature of Providence

The nature of providence, so Thomists generally hold, includes these four elements:

a) God wills, as purpose of the universe, the manifestation of His goodness.

b) Among possible worlds known to Him by simple intelligence, anterior to any decree of His will, He selected as suited to that purpose this present world, which involves, first, an order of nature subordinated to the order of grace, second, the permission of sin, third, the hypostatic order of redemptive Incarnation.

c) He freely chooses, as means suited to manifest His divine goodness, this present world with all its orders and parts.

d) He commands the execution of this choice of decree by the imperium, an intellectual act, which presupposes two efficacious acts of will, one the intention of purpose, the other the choice of means. Divine providence consists, properly and formally, in this imperium, [424] whereas divine government is the execution in time of that eternal plan which is providence.

Hence we see that providence presupposes, not merely God's conditional, inefficacious, antecedent will, but also God's consequent, absolute, efficacious will, to manifest His goodness through His own chosen ways and means, by the present orders of nature and of grace, which includes permission of sin with the consequent order of redemptive Incarnation. This order manifestly presupposes, first, God's antecedent will to save all men in virtue of which He makes really and truly possible to all men the fulfilling of His precepts. It presupposes, secondly, God's consequent will to save all men who will in fact be saved. Thus predestination, by its object, is a part, the highest part of providence.

Is providence infallible? Thomists in general answer Yes, with a distinction. Providence, inasmuch as it presupposes God's consequent will, is infallible, both in the end to be obtained and in the ways and means that lead to that end. But in as far as it presupposes solely God's antecedent will, it is infallible only with regard to ways and means. Here lies the distinction between general Providence, which makes salvation genuinely possible for all men, and predestination, which infallibly leads the elect to their preordained good.

"The will," says St. Thomas, [1454] "is related to things as they are in themselves, with all their particular circumstances. Hence we will a thing simply (simpliciter) when we will it with all its concrete circumstances. This will we call the consequent will. Thus it is clear that everything which God wills simpliciter comes to pass."

If, on the contrary, we will a thing in itself good, but independently of its circumstances, this will is called the antecedent will, or conditional will, since the good in question is not realized here and now. That man should live, says St. Thomas, [1455] is good. But if the man is a murderer, it is good that he be executed. Antecedently, God wills that harvests come to maturity, but He allows for some higher good, that not all harvests do in fact mature. Similarly, He wills antecedently the salvation of all men, though for some higher good, of which He alone is judge, He permits some to sin and perish.

But, since God never commands the impossible, His will and love make the observance of His commandments possible to all men, to each according to his measure. He gives to each, says St. Thomas, [1456] more than strict justice requires. It is thus that St. Thomas harmonizes God's antecedent will, of which St. John Damascene speaks, with God's omnipotence.

[Scriptorium]

In many discussions here, especially those relating to predestination and hell, I often see some form of the claim that God elects some souls to salvation while damning others in order to show both us his mercy and justice respectively. But if we accept the notion that God is simple, that He is His attributes and these cannot really be divided up, does it really makes sense to say that God needs two different scenarios if He is to show us both His justice and His mercy? Now, you might say that God does this for our understanding since we cannot really tell how every single act of God manifests all of his attributes equally, but in that case wouldn't God be giving us a false impression of Himself? I'm not rejecting the idea of predestination, but this argument in support of the doctrine always seemed a little strange to me.

Eternity is outside of space and time. Predestination as a doctrine makes no sense in time and space. We can know something of it through analogy, but since we live in succession, we don't understand eternity. By analogy such teaching makes quite a bit of sense.

[Vetus Ordo]

Does this interpretation run counter to the teaching of the church? I do not know. I know it is present in several of the Fathers, five right off the bat.

No, it's perfectly acceptable.

You can choose Augustine's explanation that God wills all kinds of men to be saved, or all the elect to be saved, or the Thomist view that God antecently wills all men to be saved but consequently does not.

[Crusading Philologist]

Just as a follow up, does not explicitly answer this question, but he does address the relationship between divine mercy and divine justice mere generally here:

Reply to Objection 2. God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who pays another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: "Forgive one another, as Christ has forgiven you" (Ephesians 4:32). Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy exalteth itself above judgment" (James 2:13).

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1021.htm#article3

And here:

I answer that, Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt paid according to the divine justice is one due either to God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be lacking in any work of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have said, that anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created things, is done according to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all God's works. Now the work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of something that precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine will--which is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is due to man on account of his rational soul; and his rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man is on account of the divine goodness. So in every work of God, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains, and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes. For this reason does God out of abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than is proportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness confers; because between creatures and God's goodness there can be no proportion.

Reply to Objection 1. Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1021.htm#article4

[INPEFESS]

Fascinating. Thanks for that!

[frenlenk]

Does this interpretation run counter to the teaching of the church? I do not know. I know it is present in several of the Fathers, five right off the bat.

It's fine.

Augustine's explanation that the Lord sees to it that every type of man is salvaged, or the cream, or the Aquininian vantage that the Lord wants every man to be salvaged but doesn't?