God elects some to eternal damnation?

[INPEFESS]

Melkite, I didn't post those so that you could individually tear them apart; I posted them hoping that you would at least wait until the answer to your question is posted, which, as I explained, hasn't been done yet and won't be done until Walty's post(s).

You can't take a synthesis and tear it apart with criticisms without understanding the theological intricacies behind it. It is a summary of the teaching, not a proof of it. If you would like the theological explanation behind it, then I strongly suggest you read the entire book. That is why he wrote the book and not just a synthesis, and that is why I offered to send you the book. If you have difficulties with other parts of the doctrine not related to your question, then I think it is best to refrain from formulating disagreements with it until you gain a holistic understanding of the doctrine.

The Thomists present individual principles one at a time. They prove them from Scripture, from the Church, and from theology. They play devil's advocate by assuming that the other interpretations are correct and then following them to their logical conclusions. But you can't attack any individual principle (i.e. Predilection) by itself without being patient enough to wait for the rest of the principles. Each principle by itself is insufficient and will lead to erroneous conclusions: Jansenism on the one hand and Pelagianism on the other. The real meat of the doctrine is in the interaction of these principles with each other. The mystery is in the reconciliation of all of these principles. There are entire sections (containing multiple chapters) of the book devoted to each of these difficulties, but I can't post the entire book here. I was simply providing you with the backdrop to your question. I did not intend to debate those peripheral issues.

[INPEFESS]

Well, that inspires a new question, but it's way tangential so don't answer it here.  If tghe demons sinned in eternity, then how could they ever have been good?  There is no time in eternity, so we can't say the demons sinned, before this point they were good, after this point they were evil.  So then did God specifically create them with no chance at all?  See this is why the whole issue of predestination turns God into a sadistic monster.

Rather, this is why you should read the entire doctrine before jumping to such rash conclusions. You take one part of the teaching and use it to confirm your preconception that, from this teaching, God is a sadistic monster. You aren't even giving it a chance.

See here. That particular article will answer the difficulty concerning the devils. The rest of the articles in Question 24 will answer a number of your other questions.

In each article a particular question is asked and a false answer is given. Arguments from reason are presented to support this answer ("Difficulties"). St. Thomas then answers the question correctly by [1] answering the question from authority ("To the contrary"), [2] explaining the reasoning behind this answer ("Reply"), and [3] refuting each false argument used to support the false answer ("Answers to difficulties").

You are delving into complex areas of theology that cannot be easily simplified without omitting important details. This is why I am presenting St. Thomas' responses to these questions, which must be read in their entirety in order to fully understand the answer.

[Melkite]

Melkite, I didn't post those so that you could individually tear them apart; I posted them hoping that you would at least wait until the answer to your question is posted, which, as I explained, hasn't been done yet and won't be done until Walty's post(s).

You can't take a synthesis and tear it apart with criticisms without understanding the theological intricacies behind it. It is a summary of the teaching, not a proof of it. If you would like the theological explanation behind it, then I strongly suggest you read the entire book. That is why he wrote the book and not just a synthesis, and that is why I offered to send you the book. If you have difficulties with other parts of the doctrine not related to your question, then I think it is best to refrain from formulating disagreements with it until you gain a holistic understanding of the doctrine.

The Thomists present individual principles one at a time. They prove them from Scripture, from the Church, and from theology. They play devil's advocate by assuming that the other interpretations are correct and then following them to their logical conclusions. But you can't attack any individual principle (i.e. Predilection) by itself without being patient enough to wait for the rest of the principles. Each principle by itself is insufficient and will lead to erroneous conclusions: Jansenism on the one hand and Pelagianism on the other. The real meat of the doctrine is in the interaction of these principles with each other. The mystery is in the reconciliation of all of these principles. There are entire sections (containing multiple chapters) of the book devoted to each of these difficulties, but I can't post the entire book here. I was simply providing you with the backdrop to your question. I did not intend to debate those peripheral issues.

I'm not tearing them apart, I'm posing the questions as they come up because I know I will probably have forgotten them by the time everything has been posted.  That and if I'm misunderstanding something from the beginning, how can I hope to understand any of it by the end?  If any of this is true, then it can certainly stand up to my questioning.  But I have to wonder, if there are problems with the individual principles themselves, then how can any reconciliation be anything but contrived?  And if it is necessary to force a reconciliation, how can one be so adamant that the doctrine is true?

Let me be perfectly clear.  I am interested in a correct understanding of the Church's teaching on this, and I will read everything that is posted with an open mind.  But I'm not giving the Church the benefit of the doubt that it's right.  If I don't understand it, the Church needs to prove it, I'm not taking it's word (on this particular issue) that it's right just because it says it is.  If it can't explain why it teaches something sufficiently and easily enough for the most uneducated person in the pews to understand it, then it can't possibly be a doctrine that is worthy of belief, much less necessary to be believed for one's salvation.

[jonbhorton]

Council of Orange:

We not only do not believe that any are
foreordained to evil by the power of God, but even state with utter
abhorrence that if there are those who want to believe so evil a thing,
they are anathema.

- Conclusion section.
Source: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/orange.txt

Trent:

CANON V.-If any one saith, that, since Adam's sin, the free will of man is lost and extinguished; or, that it is a thing with only a name, yea a name without a reality, a figment, in fine, introduced into the Church by Satan; let him be anathema.

CANON VI.-If any one saith, that it is not in man's power to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil God worketh as well as those that are good, not permissively only, but properly, and of Himself, in such wise that the treason of Judas is no less His own proper work than the vocation of Paul; let him be anathema.

- "On Justification", Sixth Session, Council of Trent. Source: http://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct06.html

CCC:

1037 God predestines no one to go to hell; for this, a willful turning away from God (a mortal sin) is necessary, and persistence in it until the end. In the Eucharistic liturgy and in the daily prayers of her faithful, the Church implores the mercy of God, who does not want "any to perish, but all to come to repentance"

-
-CCC# 1037 Source: http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/para/1037.htm

It is my contention that using these quotes as a window with which to view the Summa Theologica on the issue, any lack of clarity or even outright incorrectness on the part of St. Thomas Aquinas is clarified per the tri-fold authority of two councils and the official Catechism.

God does not elect some to eternal damnation. He does allow people to sin and even persist in it unto their damnation. Salvation is still available to all. If Judas had asked repentance, wouldn't want to have his penance, but he could have been saved if he'd asked. God allowed him to not ask. God did not force the sin, but it was allowed to be chosen. That God foretold it, does not mean God caused it. God cannot cause evil.

This must be read as the doctrinal foundation of this particular section of the Summa Theologica, as it seems to assume that foundation is present, for whatever reason:
Article 3. Whether God reprobates any man?:

Objection 1. It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to (Wisdom 11:25): "Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made." Therefore God reprobates no man.

Objection 2. Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For it is said (Hosea 13:9): "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me." God does not, then, reprobate any man.

Objection 3. Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For it is said (Ecclesiastes 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised." Therefore it could not be imputed to any man, were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone.

On the contrary, It is said (Malachi 1:2-3): "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau."

I answer that, God does reprobate some. For it was said above (Article 1) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above (Question 22, Article 2). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (Question 22, Article 1). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.

Reply to Objection 1. God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good--namely, eternal life--He is said to hate or reprobated them.

Reply to Objection 2. Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined--namely, glory--and of what is received in this life--namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present--namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future--namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the prophet is true--namely, "Destruction is thy own, O Israel."

Reply to Objection 3. Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as was said above (Question 19, Article 3), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of choice. Whence, although anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt.

- 1/q23/3a, Summa Theologica.
Source: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1023.htm#article3

It seems what happens is, at least in the case of the reprobated, some are foreknown to have been worthy of Hell and allowed then to engage in sin. This might be the idea of those who "get their's" here. All those celebs who trash God from their million dollar houses on television, and every other manner, but are beautiful, talented, and rich.

Meanwhile, it seems the ones who are born with nothing find the most holiness in this life, or those who cast off and abandon everything technically owed to them... to follow the will of God, i.e. religious lay brothers/sisters and clergy.

And the rest of us seem to fall somewhere in the middle.

Maybe some of us are reprobate? God willing this is not the case, but I shall not presume I'm bound for Heaven. Would really take the wind out of the fear and trembling part.

It seems we should just work our little butts off because sin has offended God, and that alone demands wailing and ashes and sackcloth on our part. Even Jesus pleaded for those who didn't know what they were doing. This would seem rather odd if somehow the pleadings and prayers of someone worthy of being heard, Christ, were superfluous and pointless. What pointless prayer can come from the mouth of God the Son, be recorded, and not have a point other than a soul can change. That an ignorant person, so given over to evil they murder God, their Messiah, might be forgiven?

God's Mercy must be infinite if He is infinite, for even one mortal sin of one person requires infinite Mercy to answer as it's an infinite offense. So, God's Mercy, though infinite, can be withheld from someone who refuses to honestly beg for it. To be contrite. To merely give lip service to God or completely ignore Him, or even insult Him willingly.

God IS Love. Love cannot create something such as a human, rational soul with the purpose, or intent, of it going to Hell. Jesus says very clearly in St. Matthew's Gospel that the hell was prepared for the devil and his angels.

And even they had to make the choice, but they made theirs with the sort of knowledge which is just totally final. We can be forgiven, whereas they can't. But If we sin mortally, we sin knowing what we do. But it was an act of our free will.

If we sin mortally, it means we sin like we're taking a crack at Jesus with a cat-'o-nine and all the rest so we can get the pleasure of X sin, in effect, causing His death on Calvary. In other words, we find ourselves at least in a parallel place to Satan and the other fallen angels when they said they would not serve. And we join them, and joining them, we join them in Hell, which we must know. If not explicitly as is taught by the Church, implicitly.

As such, it would seem the Predestined Elect might possibly have been placed in positions more favorable to their election, though they too can choose with free will to reject and sin.

This seems to me in line with the concept of the Church as Israel/Israel is the Church. But, this means the Predestined Elect also bear responsibility to both the law established by faith, and the pillar of Truth, having been properly taught if not explicitly, or having not yet learned that thing, should respond to the grace given in all ways possible. In short, since life should be both penitential and seeking communion with God, we must cast off the world: being in the world, but not of the world. Choosing to be of the world, or refusal to join those merely in the world and not of it, means damnation.

But God does not damn any man to evil, for that means God does evil works in spite of man's potential in free will to turn around. Since God cannot make any man do evil, and only having done evil gets one Hell, man himself chooses Hell just as Israel had only herself to blame for destruction.

Am I missing something?

[INPEFESS]

Melkite, I didn't post those so that you could individually tear them apart; I posted them hoping that you would at least wait until the answer to your question is posted, which, as I explained, hasn't been done yet and won't be done until Walty's post(s).

You can't take a synthesis and tear it apart with criticisms without understanding the theological intricacies behind it. It is a summary of the teaching, not a proof of it. If you would like the theological explanation behind it, then I strongly suggest you read the entire book. That is why he wrote the book and not just a synthesis, and that is why I offered to send you the book. If you have difficulties with other parts of the doctrine not related to your question, then I think it is best to refrain from formulating disagreements with it until you gain a holistic understanding of the doctrine.

The Thomists present individual principles one at a time. They prove them from Scripture, from the Church, and from theology. They play devil's advocate by assuming that the other interpretations are correct and then following them to their logical conclusions. But you can't attack any individual principle (i.e. Predilection) by itself without being patient enough to wait for the rest of the principles. Each principle by itself is insufficient and will lead to erroneous conclusions: Jansenism on the one hand and Pelagianism on the other. The real meat of the doctrine is in the interaction of these principles with each other. The mystery is in the reconciliation of all of these principles. There are entire sections (containing multiple chapters) of the book devoted to each of these difficulties, but I can't post the entire book here. I was simply providing you with the backdrop to your question. I did not intend to debate those peripheral issues.

I'm not tearing them apart, I'm posing the questions as they come up because I know I will probably have forgotten them by the time everything has been posted.

I thought you had a specific question pertaining to the motive for reprobation; but your reply seems to indicate that you have a problem with the doctrine of predestination in general, not just with the motive for reprobation.


 

That and if I'm misunderstanding something from the beginning, how can I hope to understand any of it by the end?  If any of this is true, then it can certainly stand up to my questioning.  But I have to wonder, if there are problems with the individual principles themselves, then how can any reconciliation be anything but contrived?  And if it is necessary to force a reconciliation, how can one be so adamant that the doctrine is true?

There can’t be problems with the principles since the principles are infallible declarations from the Church and Scripture. Not even Molina rejects the principles themselves. It is the manner in which the principles are reconciled that is where some theologians disagree.

Let me be perfectly clear.  I am interested in a correct understanding of the Church's teaching on this, and I will read everything that is posted with an open mind.  But I'm not giving the Church the benefit of the doubt that it's right.  If I don't understand it, the Church needs to prove it, I'm not taking it's word (on this particular issue) that it's right just because it says it is.  If it can't explain why it teaches something sufficiently and easily enough for the most uneducated person in the pews to understand it, then it can't possibly be a doctrine that is worthy of belief, much less necessary to be believed for one's salvation.

You don’t believe in the Trinity because it transcends your intellect? That it is true is an entirely different question from how it is true. We are obligated to accept the former even if we don't intellectually grasp the latter. If we had to understand the latter to accept the former, then there are few who would ever believe in the Trinity.   

[INPEFESS]

As it concerns your objections thus far, at this point they are simply misunderstandings of the doctrine that fail to take into account other aspects of the teaching not fully explained in the synthesis. I am not going to specifically address them until the main difficulty you presented has been addressed.

[jonbhorton]

There cannot be a Mystery of reprobation, without hope, and having been made by God. It would render the Truth of evangelization of the world, our entire charge, to go forth and preach (which can be done merely by obeying the Church and living out our faith), reduced to "I don't know".

That's kinda lame and makes truth unreliable.

There is no mystery of reprobation, and cannot be compared in any way to the transcendence of the intellect which the Mystery of the Holy Trinity enjoys, or even the mysterious infinity of God's Mercy which is employed for even the sins of the Elect, who, as the Summa Theologica states in 1/q23/Art6 in the reply to Objection 1, and clarified by Objections 2 and 3:

Reply to Objection 1. The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his crown: secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to fall, without raising others; according to Job 34:24: "He shall break in pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of the fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by himself or by others.

Reply to Objection 2. Although it is possible for one who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible, supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall short of its effect.

Reply to Objection 3. Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above (Article 4): and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, thought, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed.

So, there is not Mystery in the sense that one can't know in this life. If such were the case, gosh, we might as well be crypto-Calvinists, working, knowing it's pointless but assigning a point out of some misguided and desperate hope of gaming the system. It'd be tantamount to the demons helping old ladies across the street while possessing people... and not pick-pocketing them, but honestly hoping for mercy.


Rather, those who choose to reject, i.e. mortally sin, having been known, are reprobate.

In the Mysteries, they are taught as such, and not knowable here, do not purport to teach on anything such as explaining the Mystery in its entirety. The Church, however, has spoken clearly on this issue of damnation and so such a comparison is a bit straw man, having claimed no lack of knowledge due to Mystery.

The Mystery of Salvation is centered on love, not evil. Christ is the Mystery of Salvation. Christ is also the mysterious work of the Holy Trinity which is, in this work of mystery, Itself Mysterious. As Christ is in Himself, being in hypostatic union, so too is the Holy Trinity Itself and the persons of Itself in some mysterious sense.

"The universal Sacrament of Salvation

774 The Greek word mysterion was translated into Latin by two terms: mysterium and sacramentum. In later usage the term sacramentum emphasizes the visible sign of the hidden reality of salvation which was indicated by the term mysterium. In this sense, Christ himself is the mystery of salvation: "For there is no other mystery of God, except Christ."196 The saving work of his holy and sanctifying humanity is the sacrament of salvation, which is revealed and active in the Church's sacraments (which the Eastern Churches also call "the holy mysteries"). The seven sacraments are the signs and instruments by which the Holy Spirit spreads the grace of Christ the head throughout the Church which is his Body. The Church, then, both contains and communicates the invisible grace she signifies. It is in this analogical sense, that the Church is called a "sacrament."

CCC# 774
Source: http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p123a9p1.htm

234 The mystery of the Most Holy Trinity is the central mystery of Christian faith and life. It is the mystery of God in himself. It is therefore the source of all the other mysteries of faith, the light that enlightens them. It is the most fundamental and essential teaching in the "hierarchy of the truths of faith".56 The whole history of salvation is identical with the history of the way and the means by which the one true God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, reveals himself to men "and reconciles and unites with himself those who turn away from sin".57

- CCC#234
Source: http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p1s2c1p2.htm

This would mesh nicely, and really bring out the beauty of the preceding quotes from the Church, if we also looked at how this Mystery which is Christ which parallels the Mystery of the Holy Trinity is both cause of Salvation and while not denying free will to either the elect or reprobate:

Article 4. Whether Christ's predestination is the cause of ours?

Objection 1. It would seem that Christ's predestination is not the cause of ours. For that which is eternal has no cause. But our predestination is eternal. Therefore Christ's predestination is not the cause of ours.

Objection 2. Further, that which depends on the simple will of God has no other cause but God's will. Now, our predestination depends on the simple will of God, for it is written (Ephesians 1:11): "Being predestinated according to the purpose of Him, Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Therefore Christ's predestination is not the cause of ours.

Objection 3. Further, if the cause be taken away, the effect is also taken away. But if we take away Christ's predestination, ours is not taken away; since even if the Son of God were not incarnate, our salvation might yet have been achieved in a different manner, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 10). Therefore Christ's predestination is. not the cause of ours.

On the contrary, It is written (Ephesians 1:5): "(Who) hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ."

I answer that, if we consider predestination on the part of the very act of predestinating, then Christ's predestination is not the cause of ours; because by one and the same act God predestinated both Christ and us. But if we consider predestination on the part of its term, thus Christ's predestination is the cause of ours: for God, by predestinating from eternity, so decreed our salvation, that it should be achieved through Jesus Christ. For eternal predestination covers not only that which is to be accomplished in time, but also the mode and order in which it is to be accomplished in time.

Replies to Objections 1 and 2. These arguments consider predestination on the part of the act of predestinating.

Reply to Objection 3. If Christ were not to have been incarnate, God would have decreed men's salvation by other means. But since He decreed the Incarnation of Christ, He decreed at the same time that He should be the cause of our salvation.

- Summa Theologica, part 3, question 24, article 4
Source: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/4024.htm

The only conclusion I can reach is mystery in love, not God-made/caused certainty in damnation. Any other conclusion seems to directly conflict with Orange, Trent, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, and causes much consternation in the way of anyone who might be scrupulous or otherwise tempted with something seemingly worthy of them believing themselves reprobate. The thing which must be stressed is not certain damnation, but infinite mercy, as any elect who fall can have their place and crown taken. This would mesh nicely with the imagery of the Church as Israel and the issue of broken branches (the Jews) and the grafted-in (the Gentiles). As Romans 11 clearly states they can be grafted back in, and we can be broken off from our grafting: I must also assume that the pendulum swings both ways. Meaning, that the Church, being Israel, can now, having in-grafted Gentiles, break them off if they choose to sin and graft back in others, or simply graft new ones in who were never part before.

Otherwise, I see no reason for the Son to ask forgiveness for those who know not what they do. They certainly knew they were asking for murder, in hate, but they didn't know what they were doing, though they knew they were sinning in some manner; or, at least having given themselves over to Hell in God's foreknowledge, were allowed to affect that evil for to bring out good. Neither would it seem that the reprobate know they're totally screwing themselves by choosing to sin, and like the cast off Jews, sin in belief of God though rejecting what is expected: not sinning. If they find themselves facing particular judgement, I assume only God would know if they are reprobate or choose to lose election, but they still chose- what's worse for election, at least well-catechized Catholics, they'd do so with more knowledge than someone just breaking natural law- though they are still breaking the law established unto themselves (Romans 2)

This would probably be the sifting seen in Matthew 25 at the Great Judgement, as the reprobate were never known, or, having been "known" were never known by God- but they did choose to sin, just as the elect. But the elect choose to ask for forgiveness and mercy. There was no difference in vileness with St. Peter's denial and Judas' betrayal. Both were not good and totally sins. But St. Peter was not reprobate and asked for the forgiveness. Judas just hung himself while in mortal sin. But God DID NOT cause Judas to sin. Rather, it seems He merely worked His plan with an example of election and reprobate in mind. But had Judas thought back and remembered all the things he'd heard, and CHOSE to ask for forgiveness, and meant it, he could have been forgiven. But as Saint Thomas Aquinas says, foreknowledge of true choice played a part.

To say anything else is to say Orange and Trent are wrong, and the CCC is wrong for agreeing with them, at least on this issue.

Am I missing something?

[INPEFESS]

[...]

Finally, almost all theologians who admitted the absolute gratuity of predestination to salvation appealed in support of this doctrine to St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans in which, speaking of the predestination of the Gentiles and the reprobation of the Jews, he formulates general principles that are evidently applicable, as Father Lagrange remarks, to individuals, in accordance with the principle that “God works in us [in each of us] both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.” Moreover, St. Paul even says: “That He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy which He hath prepared unto glory. Whom also He hath called, not only of the Jews but also of the Gentiles.” From this we see that he has in mind not only nations but also individuals who will become, as he expressed it, vessels of glory or of ignominy. In like manner, when he says: “Whom He predestined, them He also called . . . justified . . . and glorified,” this refers to individuals. 

We saw that in the words of the preceding verse, “Whom He foreknew and predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son,” the expression “whom He foreknew” refers to those whom He previously looked upon which benevolence, which is applicable even to children who died so soon after baptism so as not to have had time for meriting. The expression “whom He foreknew” does not mean therefore “whose merits He foreknew.”

What then are the general principles formulated here by St. Paul on the question of predestination? He defined it as “purpose of God,” “Purpose of God according to election,” “according to the election of grace,” which means a purpose or resolution according to a gratuitous election, for he adds: “And if by grace, it is not now by works, otherwise grace is no more grace.”

St. Paul explains, too, in this epistle the properties and effects of predestination, for he says: “All things work together unto good, to such as according to His purpose, are called to be saints.” And immediately afterward he enumerates the three effects of predestination: vocation, justification, and glorification, which, strictly speaking, apply to individuals. Finally, he points out its infallibly efficacy, which he attributes not to the effort made by our will, but to God’s omnipotence, saying: “If God be for us who is against us?” As for the cause of predestination, he does not ascribe this to the foreknowledge of our merits, but to God’s special mercy, saying with Moses: “I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy. And I will show mercy, to whom I will show mercy.” Hence it follows that “it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that ru8nneth, but of God that showeth mercy.”

Finally, he proves this last assertion by an irrefutable principle which is the principle of predilection in a new form, for he writes: “Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made Him. For of Him and by Him and in Him, are all things.” It is always to this supreme principle that he appeals, as when he asks: “For who distinguisheth thee? Or what hast thou that thou hast not received?”

What St. Paul means in all these texts, finds its confirmation in his answer to the objections which he puts to himself, and which were taken up later on by the Pelagians and Semipelagians: “Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor? What if God, willing to show His wrath, His avenging justice, and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy which He hath prepared unto glory, where is the injustice?”

St. Augustine and St. Thomas saw in all these texts of St. Paul the gratuity of predestination to eternal life. In other words, they perceived the motive of this to be a special mercy. St. Augustine often said that if God grants final perseverance to this particular person, it is by reason of His mercy; if He does not grant it to that other person, it is because of just punishment of sins, in the generality of cases repeated, and which have estranged the souls from God. St. Thomas and St. Prosper declared the same in these words retained by the Council of Quierzy: “That certain persons are saved, is the gift of Him who saves; but that certain persons are lost, is the fault of those who are lost.”

This explains the attitude of theologians such as Tanquerey who, after giving us an analysis of what St. Paul said on predestination, writes as follows: “Moreover, all these utterances are nothing else but the very thesis of the Thomists; for they presuppose that God of His good pleasure elects us to glory, and that all good things are the result of this election, even our merits.”

In addition to these reason which are taken from Holy Scripture and which constitute the foundation of St. Thomas’ doctrine on the cause of predestination, we have the argument of theological reasoning which the holy Doctor gives as follows: “Predestination is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end. But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposed, in the order of reason, that God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and love.”

In other words, whoever acts wisely, wills the end before the means. Now God acts with sovereign wisdom, and grace is the means with reference to the glory or salvation. Therefore God first wills glory to His elect, and then the grace so as to have them attain it. St. Thomas, as we see, was in advance of Scotus in the presentation of this theological argument, and on this point Bellarmine and Suarez are in agreement with him.

This is one of the points that illustrate most clearly how St. Thomas and the greatest theologians along with him fear neither logic nor mystery. It is logic itself that leads them to the transcendence of the mystery, which is an object of contemplation far above reasoning.

Thus the motive of predestination becomes clear and, at the same time, that of negative reprobation as explained by St. Thomas in the following words: “The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God’s goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe, there are required different grads of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen. Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, but means of His mercy, in sparing them; and in respect of others, whom He reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (Rom. 9: 22-23): ‘What if God, willing to show His wrath, that is, the vengeance of His justice, and to make His power known, endured, that is, permitted with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory.’ And elsewhere the same Apostle wrote (II Tim. 2: 20): ‘But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and earth; and some, indeed, unto honour, but some unto dishonor.’ Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others has no reason except the divine will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. XXVI in Joan. ): ‘Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge if thou dost not wish to err.’ Thus, too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of specifies in things of nature. Yet why this particular par of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in this part of the wall and that in another; although the plant requires that some stones should be in this place and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepared unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously a person can give more or less, just as he pleases provided he deprives nobody of his due, without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: ‘Take what is thine and go they way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?’ “ (Matt.20: 14-15.)

What is due to each one, what God refuses to nobody, is sufficient grace for salvation, which makes it really possible to keep the commandments, for God never commands what is impossible. As for efficacious grace, especially the grace of final perseverance, this He grants by reason of His mercy. But of the adults, only those are deprived of it who through their own fault refuse to accept it. The doctors of the Church often pointed this out in the comparison they drew between the death of the good thief and that of Judas who resisted the final appeal of grace.

The general motive for predestination is, therefore, the manifestation of God’s goodness that assumes the form of mercy in pardoning; and the motive for the predestination of this particular person rather than a certain other, is God’s good pleasure. If it be so, how shall we formulate in exact terms the motive for either positive or negative reprobation?

[Melkite]

As it concerns your objections thus far, at this point they are simply misunderstandings of the doctrine that fail to take into account other aspects of the teaching not fully explained in the synthesis. I am not going to specifically address them until the main difficulty you presented has been addressed.

I'm fine with that.  As long as they are addressed at some point, either by auto-resolution or by you or Walty in the end, I don't mind if we don't address them immediately.

[Melkite]

St. Augustine and St. Thomas saw in all these texts of St. Paul the gratuity of predestination to eternal life. In other words, they perceived the motive of this to be a special mercy. St. Augustine often said that if God grants final perseverance to this particular person, it is by reason of His mercy; if He does not grant it to that other person, it is because of just punishment of sins, in the generality of cases repeated, and which have estranged the souls from God. St. Thomas and St. Prosper declared the same in these words retained by the Council of Quierzy: “That certain persons are saved, is the gift of Him who saves; but that certain persons are lost, is the fault of those who are lost.”

This is something that needs to be addressed at some point, how God can either be all-merciful or all-just, if he does not show both to all, but only one to some and the other to others.

Thus the motive of predestination becomes clear and, at the same time, that of negative reprobation as explained by St. Thomas in the following words: “The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God’s goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe, there are required different grads of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen. Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. ... Thus, too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of specifies in things of nature. Yet why this particular par of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in this part of the wall and that in another; although the plant requires that some stones should be in this place and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepared unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously a person can give more or less, just as he pleases provided he deprives nobody of his due, without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: ‘Take what is thine and go they way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?’ “ (Matt.20: 14-15.)

This sounds like a cop-out.  If the completion of the universe requires different grades of being, and certain evils are permitted to allow for the greater good of those different grades of being, what would have happened if the fall had never taken place?  Would the universe have never come to completion, since there wasn't enough evil in it to divide grades of being?  And how could the results of God allowing evil ever be said to be a greater good than if the fall had never taken place?  If God allowed even the fall to take place because he saw a greater good in the result of that, than if the fall had not taken place, then we can only deduce that either God actively willed for this evil to take place as a part of his created order, or he only foreknew the greater good but was completely impotent in bringing it about on his own without human evil.  In fact, that brings up another good question.  If it is so important for God to show that he is just by damning some, however would he have been able to show his justice if the Fall, human or angelic, had never taken place?

The fire and earth example of this, though, doesn't follow, because in their diversity, two good things are being compared, not one good and one evil.

The general motive for predestination is, therefore, the manifestation of God’s goodness that assumes the form of mercy in pardoning; and the motive for the predestination of this particular person rather than a certain other, is God’s good pleasure. If it be so, how shall we formulate in exact terms the motive for either positive or negative reprobation?

So, again, if the Fall had never taken place, would it be impossible for God's goodness to be manifested in justice?  Or, each person chose not to repent?  How then would God be able to show his goodness manifested in mercy?  Either it is unneccesary that both God's mercy and justice be shown, or it is, and God is forcing the hands of some by predestination, positive and negative, so that each can be shown, and those whose hands are forced truly have no choice in which direction they are being forced.